ENIP Fuzz: a Scapy-based EtherNet/IP fuzzer for security testing by Tacliad, Francisco
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2016-09
ENIP Fuzz: a Scapy-based EtherNet/IP fuzzer
for security testing
Tacliad, Francisco
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56714
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.











Thesis Co-Advisors: Mark Gondree
Thuy D. Nguyen
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and
to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank) 2. REPORT DATE
September 2016
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s Thesis 07-07-2014 - 09-23-2016
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE




7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT
NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol Number: N/A.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
EtherNet/IP is an industrial protocol that is built on top of the TCP/IP protocol suite. Though extending TCP/IP connectivity to 
industrial control systems (ICS) has enabled operators to implement more agile practices, it also has made ICSs more readily 
accessible to the outside world. Embedded control systems on Navy afloat and ashore platforms utilize EtherNet/IP, making those 
platforms prime targets for cyber attack. Fuzzing technology can analyze the message structure of ICS protocols like EtherNet/IP to 
help inform users on the robustness of the implementation. This thesis explores a proprietary EtherNet/IP implementation to 
determine its susceptibility to malformed packets. ENIP Fuzz, a Scapy-based fuzzer, was built to test for potential security 
vulnerabilities in EtherNet/IP implementations. This custom fuzz testing tool verifies the robustness of target applications or devices 
in handling abnormal input data. Results of this effort revealed a previously unreported vulnerability in an industrial controller 
commonly used in Navy control systems that causes a Denial of Service (DoS) by a single malformed packet.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18
i
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
ii
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
ENIP FUZZ: A SCAPY-BASED ETHERNET/IP FUZZER FOR SECURITY
TESTING
Francisco Tacliad
Civilian, SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific
B.A., University of California Los Angeles, 2008
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of









Chair, Department of Computer Science
iii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
iv
ABSTRACT
EtherNet/IP is an industrial protocol that is built on top of the TCP/IP protocol suite. Though 
extending TCP/IP connectivity to industrial control systems (ICS) has enabled operators to 
implement more agile practices, it also has made ICSs more readily accessible to the outside 
world. Embedded control systems on Navy afloat and ashore platforms utilize EtherNet/IP, 
making those platforms prime targets for cyber attack. Fuzzing technology can analyze the 
message structure of ICS protocols like EtherNet/IP to help inform users on the robustness 
of the implementation. This thesis explores a proprietary EtherNet/IP implementation to 
determine its susceptibility to malformed packets. ENIP Fuzz, a Scapy-based fuzzer, was 
built to test for potential security vulnerabilities in EtherNet/IP implementations. This 
custom fuzz testing tool verifies the robustness of target applications or devices in handling 
abnormal input data. Results of this effort revealed a previously unreported vulnerability 
in an industrial controller commonly used in Navy control systems that causes a Denial of 
Service (DoS) by a single malformed packet.
v
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Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vital components to the operation and functioning
of critical infrastructure systems. There are sixteen critical infrastructure sectors defined
by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and most, if not all, utilizes some form
of ICS to manage and operate their assets [1]. To serve the need for greater efficiency
and automation, industrial control systems have been extended to operate over Ethernet.
EtherNet/IP is an industry standard ICS protocol that is built on top of Ethernet and is used
in Navy platforms ashore and afloat to serve the need for greater efficiency and automation.
Ethernet-based technologies have enabled operators to implement more agile practices, but
it also has significantly increased the exposure of these critical infrastructures to the outside
world.
The current lack of visibility into the lower layers of Navy control systems is a risk to
the operational readiness and security of the warfighter. This thesis aims to improve
security posture of afloat and ashore platforms by investigating potential vulnerabilities in
the EtherNet/IP implementation of commercial ICS equipment commonly used in these
platforms.
1.1 Motivation
Afloat and ashore control systems are protected by varying levels of boundary defense,
but often have exploitable network interiors. In order to map vulnerabilities related to the
network infrastructure, vulnerabilities within the underlying protocol must be considered.
Fuzzing or fuzz testing is an analysis technique to verify the robustness of target applications
or devices in handling abnormal input data. Fuzzing the implementations of control network
protocols is an important step towards developing more secure industrial control systems.
Voyiatzis et al. argue that control networks are well-suited for fuzz testing because the
systems are likely to have been developed years ago, the source code and specification
may not be available, a variety of vendor-specific implementations may exist, and Internet
connectivity is increasingly integrated with such systems [2].
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1.1.1 Navy Relevance
Devices communicating via EtherNet/IP are used in Navy control systems, including sim-
ple I/O devices such as sensors and actuators, as well as complex control devices such as
programmable logic controllers and industrial networking appliances. The machinery con-
trol systems aboard Navy Ships use a number of fieldbus protocols, including EtherNet/IP,
to satisfy a wide range of embedded shipboard systems that vary in size and complexity,
e.g., combat weapon systems, Hull Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) systems, and ship
control systems [3]. The Navy has a keen interest in making these types of systems robust to
cyber attacks. In particular, WeaselBoard—developed under the Speed-to-Fleet US Navy
project—targets protecting Allen Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) ICS components
that communicate via EtherNet/IP [4]. Thus, black-box testing of the protocol stack for
these devices is a natural extension of those priorities.
1.2 Objectives
Vulnerabilities in ICS protocol implementations have been found by fuzzing, but little
information has been made publicly available on EtherNet/IP. The goal of this research
is to develop a custom fuzz testing tool to stress test the EtherNet/IP implementation of
select AB/RA devices. Our testing approach leverages remote fault detection techniques
to identify faults triggered by fuzz testing. Our fuzzer is modeled after Scapy, a Python
module used for packet parsing and crafting [5]. Its flexibility to send, sniff, dissect and
forge network packets has made it a popular tool among penetration testers seeking to
discover protocol vulnerabilities.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the EtherNet/IP
protocol. Chapter 3 introduces fuzz testing and provides a technical survey of available ICS
tools. Chapter 4 describes the design and approach that is applied to fuzzing EtherNet/IP.
Chapter 5 discusses the implementation of our EtherNet/IP fuzzer and analyzes the results




Background: EtherNet/IP and CIP Specification
EtherNet/IP, or EtherNet Industrial Protocol, is an ICS protocol that encapsualtes the Com-
mon Industrial Protocol (CIP) in its upper layers [6]. The EtherNet/IP and CIP protocol
suite is managed by the Open DeviceNet Vendor Association (ODVA). ODVA publishes
the The EtherNet/IP Specification and The CIP Specification and administers conformance
testing to ensure compliance with the standard [6].
2.1 Common Industrial Protocol
The Common Industrial Protocol, or CIP, provides messaging services for manufacturing
automation and the functionality needed for configuration, safety, motion, control, syn-
chronization and information applications [6]. CIP gives users the ability to incorporate
these manufacturing applications with Ethernet networks [6]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the four
protocols—EtherNet/IP, CompoNet, ControlNet andDeviceNet—that use CIP’s application
layer, application object libraries, and device profiles for the upper layers of their network
protocol stack. It is only the lowest four layers of the OSI model that are network protocol
dependent.
2.1.1 CIP Objects
CIP is an object-oriented protocol. The CIP family shares commonly defined objects and
only a few are specific to the selected link layer [7]. According the specification, the CIP
node is modeled as a set of Objects [8]. An Object is an abstract representation of a
particular component within a product. A Class is a set of Objects of the same kind of
system component. An Object Instance is the actual representation of a particular Object.
An Instance of a Class share the same attributes, but has its own unique attribute values [8].
Figure 2.2 illustrates multiple Object Instances within a Class of Objects that can reside in
a CIP node [8].
The CIP object library supports general purpose network communications, network ser-
vices, and automation functions used by industrial components such as analog and digital
3
Figure 2.1. CIP Common Layers
This figure illustrates how EtherNet/IP, DeviceNet and ControlNet share the CIP
Common layers. Source [6, Figure 2.1]: I. Open DeviceNet Vendor Association,
“Ethernet/IP quick start for vendors handbook,” ODVA, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI, Tech.
Rep. PUB00035R0, 2008.
input/output devices, Human Machine Interface (HMI), and motion control. To support
interoperability, conformance with CIP standard ensures the same objects implemented by
different devices behave identically. A group of objects used in a device is referred to as that
device’s Object Model [8]. The Object Model in CIP is based on the producer-consumer
communication model.
2.2 EtherNet/IP
EtherNet/IP is the name given to CIP over standard Ethernet. The EtherNet/IP standard
defines port 44818 as the designated port over which EtherNet/IP devices accept TCP and
UDP connections. Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between EtherNet/IP and the OSI
model.
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Figure 2.2. A Class of Objects
An example of a CIP node, Object, and Object Instances. Source [8, Figure 2.2]:
The CIP Networks Library Volume 1: Common Industrial Protocol, 3rd ed., Open
DeviceNet Vendor Association, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI, November 2007.
Figure 2.3. EtherNet/IP and the OSI Model
Relationship between EtherNet/IP and the OSI model. Source [6, Figure 2.3]:
I. Open DeviceNet Vendor Association, “Ethernet/IP quick start for vendors hand-
book,” ODVA, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI, Tech. Rep. PUB00035R0, 2008.
2.2.1 Types of EtherNet/IP Communications
EtherNet/IP uses two primary types of communications: implicit and explicit [6]. For
greater network efficiency, implicit messaging utilizes the CIP producer/consumer model
[6]. This model enables a sending device (i.e., the producer) to exchange scheduled,
time-critical control data to one or more receiving devices (i.e., the consumers) [6].
With implicit messaging, a CIP connection must be established [6]. Communication ses-
sions related to a specific connection are assigned a unique connection identifier upon
establishing a connection [6]. The CIP connection identifier acts as a dedicated commu-
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nication path allowing multiple end-points to share data without the need to send the data
multiple times [6]. Implicit messaging uses UDP and can be unicast or multicast [6].
Explicitmessaging provides general request/reply (or client/server) communication between
two devices and is used for non-real-time data. For EtherNet/IP, explicit messaging uses
TCP and does not require establishing a CIP connection [6].
2.2.2 Types of EtherNet/IP Implementations
EtherNet/IPmay be implemented as software or hardware. ODVAhas defined four hardware
classifications: Explicit Message Server, Explicit Message Client, I/O Adapter, and I/O
Scanner [6]. AnExplicitMessageServer responds to explicitmessages initiated by aExplicit
Message Client. Alternatively, an Explicit Message Client initiates explicit messaging with
other devices. An I/O adapter is also an explicit message server and receives implicit
message requests, responding with its I/O data at the requested rate. An I/O scanner
initiates implicit messages with other I/O adapter devices, and may support initiating
explicit messages. At a minimum, all EtherNet/IP devices are required to support explicit
server capabilities [6]. Figure 2.4 is a diagram of the four EtherNet/IP device classifications,
including device examples.
Figure 2.4. EtherNet/IP Device Classification
Matrix of Device Classifications and EtherNet/IP communications. Source [6,
Figure 2.4]: I. Open DeviceNet Vendor Association, “Ethernet/IP quick start for
vendors handbook,” ODVA, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI, Tech. Rep. PUB00035R0, 2008.
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This research focuses on the EtherNet/IP stack of a specific device, the Allen Bradley
MicroLogix 1100. More details on this device will be discussed in the chapter on Design.
7
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CHAPTER 3:
Industrial Control System Fuzzers
Fuzzing or fuzz testing is a vulnerability analysis technique used to assess the robustness of
target applications or devices in handling invalid, malformed, or unexpected input data. In
general, fuzzers operate under two basic assumptions: faults contained in a target application
can be triggered through input controlled by the user and the execution of a faulty portion
of an application will result in some behavioral manifestation (e.g., bricking the device or
producing unexpected output) [9]. Most systems are designed to work with specific inputs
but should be robust enough to gracefully handle malformed data. Therefore, flaws found
from fuzzing will correspond to a bug in the target (e.g., file, network protocol, embedded
device, and software).
Sutton divides general fuzz testing into five phases [10]. Figure 3.1 is a graphical represen-
tation of the fuzzing phases:
Figure 3.1. Fuzzing Phases
1. Identify target. The target identification phase involves the selection of a target for
vulnerability analysis. Target identification will likely guide what tool or technique
will be applied.
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2. Identify potential fuzz variables. Anything sent from the client to the target should be
considered a potential fuzz variable.
3. Generate fuzzed data. Depending upon the data format and the target, the identified
input can be mutated or generated. Once input vectors have been identified, fuzz data
must be mutated or generated randomly.
4. Execute fuzzed data. The fuzzed data execution phase could involve opening a file,
launching a target process, or sending a data packet to the target.
5. Fault monitoring. The fault monitoring phase is responsible for monitoring the
behavior of the system under test (SUT) in response to fuzzed data.
Though fuzzers may differ in their support of these operations, fault monitoring is of
particular importance. At its most basic level, a fuzzer might detect that a fault was triggered
if the target crashes or becomes bricked, i.e., application is rendered unusable or is unable to
accept a new connection [10]. More sophisticated fault detection may be achieved with the
help of a debugger. For example, the Peach and Sulley fuzzing frameworks communicate
directly with a debugger attached to the target application [10], [11]. Sutton et al. propose
an alternative, where a debugger runs on the target platform to monitor exceptions and
correlate fuzzing behavior with observed faults [10].
3.1 Fuzzing Methodologies
While there is no universally-accepted taxonomy of fuzzing approaches, most of the lit-
erature places fuzzers into one of two categories: mutation-based and generation-based.
Mutation-based fuzzers apply transformations (mutations) on existing data samples to create
test cases [12]. Generation-based fuzzers create test cases from models of SUT behavior.
Each method has its own strengths and weaknesses.
3.1.1 Mutation-Based Fuzzers
Mutation-based fuzzers modify valid inputs by altering bytes to create fuzzed inputs [12].
Some mutation fuzzers utilize a description of the input fields, while other mutation fuzzers
do not require any knowledge of the format; instead, they use heuristics to guess field
structure and mutate each field [12]. Most mutation fuzzers extract data from recorded
sessions formutation, although some fuzzers intercept andmutate live traffic [12]. Mutation-
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based fuzzing is considered a form of brute force testing in that the fuzzer starts with valid
inputs and incrementally transforms every bit within the input [10]. This requires little
up-front research and implementing a naive mutation-based is relatively straightforward.
The SUT may employ complex logic infrequently invoked. Many fuzzing iterations may
be required to achieve sufficient code coverage, though this challenge can be offset with
automation.
3.1.2 Generation-Based Fuzzers
Generation-based fuzzers construct test cases employing rules defining a grammar-based
specification for inputs. The most simplest fuzzers of this type create input data of random
strings of bytes [12]. Some generation-based fuzzers must be configured using some input
description or data model to generate test cases [10]. The generation-based approach
requires up-front research to understand the specification or source code of the target.
However, rather than using hard-coded test cases, a generation-based fuzzer uses grammar-
based rules to dynamically pinpoint the portions of the file or packet that represent fuzzable
variables.
3.2 ICS Protocol Fuzzers
In Table 3.1, we survey relevant fuzzers and fuzzing frameworks, highlighting, when appli-
cable, those ICS protocols each supports. Smith and Francia [13] report on an EtherNet/IP
and CIP fuzzer, but the code is not available. As far as we know, there is no open-source
fuzzer supporting EtherNet/IP or CIP.
In Table 3.1, we classify the surveyed software as either a custom fuzzer or a fuzzing
framework. Custom, or one-off, fuzzers exhaustively iterate through a specific target format
or network protocol. They can be used to stress test a wide range of applications that
support the target format or protocol. The Modbus/TCP Fuzzer (MTF) and scada-tools are
two custom fuzzers written using Scapy for Modbus and Profinet, respectively [2], [14].
Sutton [10] descibes fuzzing frameworks as homogenous development environments that
enable the use of reusable utilities to maximize extensiblity. Sulley and Peach are examples
of open-source, generation-based fuzzing frameworks that support some ICS protocols
[12]. Sulley is a framework consisting of multiple extensible components, including an
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instrument to monitor the health status of the target and detect, track, and categorize what
sequence of test cases triggers faults [10]. Sulley can also fuzz in parallel, increasing
performance [10]. At DEFCON 15, Devarajan described using the Sulley framework to
fuzz Modbus, DNP3 and ICCP [15]. Similarly, Peach is designed for flexiblity. It provides
custom fuzzing strategies and data modifiers, as well as special processes called Agents for
fault detection [11].
Table 3.1. Table of ICS Fuzzers
Name Type Protocol Availability
Aegis Fuzzer [16], [17] custom DNP3, Modbus commercially licensed,
early version open-
source
Beyond Security’s beSTORM [18] framework several, including DNP3 commercially licensed
blackPeer [19] framework several, including Modbus NA
Codenomicon’s Defensics [20] framework several, including CIP, EtherNet/IP,Modbus, OPCUA
Server, Profinet, Scada GOOSE
commercially licensed
ICCP Fuzzer [21] custom ICCP NA
LZFuzz [22] framework several, including SNMP [12] NA
MTF [2] custom Modbus NA
OPC-MFuzzer [23] custom OPC, DCOM, RPC [24] NA
OPC Server Fuzzer [25] custom OPC Server NA
Peach [11] framework several, including Modbus, BACNet, DNP3, OPC
[11], [23]
open-source
ProFuzz [26] custom Profinet open-source
scada-tools [14], [27] custom Profinet open-source
Sulley [28] framework several, including Modbus, DNP3, TPKT, COPT [15] open-source
Wuldtech’s Achilles [29] custom several, including EtherNet/IP, Foundation Fieldbus,






This research is intended to provide a vulnerability analysis tool for EtherNet/IP. A Scapy-
based fuzzer for EtherNet/IP was developed to identify anomalies triggered by sending
malformed input to the system under test (SUT). The fuzzer is general enough to support
testing all implementations of EtherNet/IP.
4.1 Design Goals
ENIP Fuzz is a custom fuzzer for testing security vulnerabilities in the EtherNet/IP and CIP
layers of an EtherNet/IP stack implementation. Herein, unless explicitly specified, the term
EtherNet/IP denotes both layers. This research proposes remote analysis strategies employ-
ing a liveness check, unexpected responses, and performance measurement to monitor the
remote device during testing. We describe these strategies further in Section 4.2. Next we
outline each of the components used to support this strategy, and their goals.
4.1.1 SUT
ENIP Fuzz can be applied to both software and hardware implementations of EtherNet/IP
(see Section 2.2). While flaw discovery at other implementation of the EtherNet/IP stack of
the SUT is possible, it is out of scope of our initial study. These out-of-scope flaws include
those in the SUT when handling malformed packets at layers carrying the EtherNet/IP data,
such as the TCP, CompoNet, ControlNet and DeviceNet transports.
4.1.2 Background Traffic
This study utilizes background traffic to facilitate remote monitoring and fault detection.
The primary role of the background traffic generators are to produce remote requests to
the SUT. A client device or client software application may be programmed to generate
requests to act as background traffic during testing.
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4.2 Approach
ENIP Fuzz is developed to fuzz fields within ENIP and CIP request packets. There are three
ways the fuzzer remotely monitors for faults generated when fuzzing: a liveness check,
unexpected responses, and performance degradation.
Many existing fuzzing approaches attach a debugger to the SUT to determine when crashes
occur. For example, Basnight uses an available Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) interface
for debugging the Allen Bradley ControlLogix L61 CPU [30]. Debugging with JTAG
requires special pins called test access ports which may not be available in all devices.
Other studies have leveraged built-in fault monitoring utilities. Dunlap describes using a
task monitor utility available in the ControlLogix L61 to access timing data from ladder
logic execution times for an anomaly based intrusion detection system [31]. Attaching
a debugger or performance monitor is not an option for our experiments, so we adopt
alternative, remote-fault monitoring methods.
Since explicit interaces for fault detection are not always available, people have used remote
analysis to determine when crashes have occured. Shapiro et al. describe using a liveness
check to identify when an ICS device revives itself during a fuzzing session [12]. Their
study suggests that for protocols running over TCP, the occurrence of a TCP RST flag is
a sufficient metric for indicating that a target device has crashed; however they concede
that this method may produce false positives. Similarly, Voyiatzis et al. argue that direct
access to the SUT is not needed, simply a network connection to it [2]. They suggest that
through network behavior—such as socket timeout, reset, or close; failure in reopening a
closed socket; and failure in opening a new socket—are useful indications that the SUT has
crashed. ENIP Fuzz utilizes such indicators to judge if the target has crashed.
ENIP Fuzz also filters for unexpected responses. Voyiatzis et al. record information during
fuzzing the Modbus protocol to check if responses were outside of the specification [2].
Similarly, ENIP Fuzz inspects response packet data for responses that do not conform to the
specification.
For monitoring performance when fuzzing, a baseline of valid traffic for each generator
is recorded and compared to the traffic captured during fuzzing. These baselines serve
as a control, modeling how the device should behave under normal operation (e.g., valid
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EtherNet/IP requests). Records captured during fuzzing are compared to the baseline and
analyzed for irregularities in response times. Any anomalous behavior is correlated with
fuzz scenario, using timestamps and packet inspection.
To our knowledge, no other study has considered performance as a type of fault for detection
during fuzzing. The NIST Guide to Supervisory Control and Data (SCADA) and Industrial
Control Systems Security highlights that ICSs are generally time critical; where delay
of information cannot be tolerated [32]. Thus, malformed packets impacting the timely
delivery of responses may be considered a type of soft failure, causing the SUT to go
outside normal behavior. One of the contributions of our study is in exploring three
potential performance metrics during fuzzing (discussed further in Section 4.3) to ascertain
their reasonableness as candidates for detecting these types of soft failures.
4.3 Environment
Four principal components make up our environment: the SUT, the fuzzer, background
traffic generators, and the monitor. The test equipment for the experiments consists of an
Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1100 PLC, a Windows 7 Virtual Machine (VM) with RSLinx, a
Kali 2.0 VMwith the fuzzer, a Kali 2.0 VMwith the Ping utility, and a workstation withMac
OSX runningWireshark. The equipment are connected via Ethernet to a common hub. The
SUT employed in this study is the Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1100 PLC, 1763-L16BWA
Series B, firmware version 14. The MicroLogix 1100 is an EtherNet/IP I/O scanner device
that supports explicit messaging. Experimental traffic sent to the SUT is generated by a
Kali 2.0 host running ENIP Fuzz. The background traffic generators are two hosts: Kali
2.0 running Ping and Kali 2.0 running RSLinx. The Ping utility is used to send ICMP
Echo Requests at one second intervals. RSLinx is software for Allen Bradley devices used
to browse and configure PLC devices. To generate requests, RSLinx is set to autobrowse
mode, causing it to send UDP broadcast EtherNet/IP List Identity Response requests to
the SUT (and, in fact all devices connected to the network). The monitor is Mac OS X
host running Wireshark to collect all traffic for analysis. Figure 4.1 shows these elements,
connected in the test environment.
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Figure 4.1. Design of Fuzzer
This figure illustrates the fuzzing test environment.
During experimentation, a liveness check is performed using the Ping utility to determine
that the target is still responsive. For performance degradation, we monitor the latency
in responses to both ICMP Echo Requests and EtherNet/IP requests made by the RSLinx.
Irregularities in recorded response times may suggest increased CPU utilization or memory
exhaustion related to fuzz testing. The SUT is also monitored for unexpected responses, ie,





This chapter provides details on the implementation of ENIP Fuzz and an analysis of
the results from experimentation. First we discuss the implementation of an EtherNet/IP
support library, followed by the implementation of ENIP Fuzz. We then describe the three
EtherNet/IP service requests that were fuzzed, the results of this experimentation, and a
denial of service (DoS) fault that was discovered.
5.1 Implementation of Support Library
ENIP Fuzz is supported by an EtherNet/IP support library that was built using Scapy,
a Python module used for packet crafting and manipulaiton [5]. This library was built
conforming to specification and leveraged Wireshark’s dissector for EtherNet/IP protocol
parsing [8], [33]. Wireshark versions 1.0.0 to 2.0.4 ships with an EtherNet/IP plugin
[34]. ENIP Fuzz is not a one-to-one translation of Wireshark’s source code, which is
written in C. Internally, they are not the same; instead, Wireshark was used for validating
data field structure rather than reuse of its parsing logic. In fact, we discovered errors
in Wireshark’s implementation of the CIP Common Services, specifically the Muliple
Service Packet [8, §A-4.10]. Additionally, Wireshark does not support proprietary vendor
specific EtherNet/IP implementations, such as Allen Bradley’s Programmable Controller
Communication Commands (PCCC) protocol [35].
ENIP Fuzz is complete in its support of the EtherNet/IP specification [33] and approximately
one fourth of the CIP specification [8]. To characterize the EtherNet/IP traffic space we
collected several samples of communication from our ICS lab environment, which included
the AB/RA MicroLogix 1100 and ControlLogix 5570 devices. From these traffic captures
we priotized our coverage of the specification and implemented every EtherNet/IP and CIP
service that was observed. In addition, we added support for Allen Bradley’s proprietary
implementation of EtherNet/IP, PCCC [35].
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5.2 Implementation of Fuzzer
Based on observed traffic in our lab, three types of EtherNet/IP service requests were chosen
as test cases to fuzz: EtherNet/IP RegisterSession, CIP NOP, and Execute PCCC Service.
For each of these, fields were selected as primitives to fuzz based on the observed volatility
in the field’s value. Fields that remained static after having been assigned a constant value,
like the Session Handle, a field used for a unique identifier, were not fuzzed. Additionally,
fuzzing was performed only at the layer in which the service request is encapsulated. Each
EtherNet/IP service request is encapsulated at a different layer, which means that across the
three tests we were fuzzing fields in each of these three layers: EtherNet/IP (for EtherNet/IP
Register Session), CIP (for CIP NOP), and PCCC (for Execute PCCC Service). The
following sections provide more detail on these services and how each were fuzzed.
5.2.1 EtherNet/IP RegisterSession Request
The EtherNet/IP RegisterSession Request is used for establishing a TCP encapsulation
session between an originator and a target. As defined by the specficiation [33, §2-4.4],
the originator shall open a TCP/IP connection to the target on port 0xAF12; the originator
shall then send an EtherNet/IP RegisterSession request to the target. Upon receiving a
valid RegisterSession request, the target shall assign and reply with a unique a session
identifier called the Session Handle, an unsigned 32-bit integer value [33]. Figure 5.1 and
5.2 illustrates the structure of the Register Session request.
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Figure 5.1. An Example EtherNet/IP Register Session Request
An Example EtherNet/IP Register Session Request as output by our support library,
highlighting fields encapsulated at the EtherNet/IP layer.
Figure 5.2. Packet Structure of an Example EtherNet/IP Register Session
Request
This figure illustrates the packet structure of an Example EtherNet/IP Register
Session Request as output by our support library, highlighting fields encapsulated
at the EtherNet/IP layer.
To fuzz the EtherNet/IP Register Session Request, we manipulated the Protocol Version
and Options Flags, first in isolation and then simultaneously. Both of these fields take the
value of an unsigned 16-bit integer value. For each test case, ENIP Fuzz is programmed to
fuzz these fields with a random integer from 0 to 65535. Per the specification [33, §2-4.4]
and experimentation, with the exception of Session Handle, these are the only non-constant
fields.
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5.2.2 CIP NOP Request
The CIP NOP (No Operation) Request is a CIP common service that causes the receiving 
object to generate a No Operation response [8, §A-4.17]. The object receiving the CIP NOP 
request does not execute any other internal action; if the object does not support the CIP 
NOP, a response with a status error is returned [8, §A-4.17]. The CIP NOP Request was 
chosen because of its simplicity. The CIP NOP has no specified data field structure and is 
only embedded in an EtherNet/IP Send RR Data Packet. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the 
structure of a valid CIP NOP.
Figure 5.3. An Example CIP NOP Request
An Example CIP NOP Request as output by our support library, highlighting fields
encapsulated at the CIP layer.
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Figure 5.4. Packet Structure of an Example CIP NOP Request
This figure illustrates the packet structure of an Example CIP NOP Request as
output by our support library, highlighting fields encapsulated at the CIP layer.
As the CIP NOP does not have any associated data field structure, the Class and Instance
fields within the Request Path were fuzzed individually and then at the same time. Class and
Instance are a type of CIP segment used for referencing a specific CIP entity [8]. Segments
are grouped together in order to define a relationship among different objects. The Request
Path is a value used to specify such a relationship.
5.2.3 Execute PCCC Service
PCCC is a Rockwell Automation vendor-specific application-layer protocol used for com-
munication between certain Allen Bradley processors [35]. Unlike the EtherNet/IP Register 
Session and CIP NOP, the Execute PCCC Service is not a common service. According to 
Allen Bradley, PCCC is used primarily to “ease communication between legacy networks 
and the new CIP networks” [36, p. 7.17]. EtherNet/IP products are able to support PCCC 
through encapsulation within CIP. The RSLogix 500 Software, used to program ladder logic 
for Allen Bradley PLCs, was observed in our lab to send Execute PCCC Service commands. 
The high regularity with which that software would send the Execute PCCC Service was 
the motivating factor in its selection for fuzzing. The protected typed logical write with 
three address fields was the specific Execute PCCC Service function chosen for fuzzing. 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 illustrate a valid command of this type. This function is used to read 
data from a logical address [36, p. 7.17]. To fuzz this function the following fields were 
manipulated in isolation and then in combination: Byte Size, File Number, File Type, and 
Element Number.
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Figure 5.5. An Example Execute PCCC Service
An Example Execute PCCC Service - Protected Typed Logical Write with Three
Address Fields as output by our support library, highlighting fields encapsulated at
the PCCC layer.
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Figure 5.6. Packet Structure of an Example Execute PCCC Service
This figure illustrates the packet structure of an Example Execute PCCC Service as
output by our support library, highlighting fields encapsulated at the PCCC layer.
5.3 Results and Analysis
As described in Chapter 4, we identified three metrics for analysis: the deltas between
ICMP Echo requests from Ping, List Identity requests from RSLinx, and the response
from the service request being fuzzed. The SUT interacts with the traffic generators for
about 5 minutes during a "warm-up period," after which the fuzzer sends either correctly
formed packets (during baseline) or malformed packets (during testing) for a period of
approximately 20 minutes. The Wireshark dump of the fuzzing session is then truncated
into a 10 minute window, after which each of the metrics are investigated for analysis. Each
delta is calculated by taking the difference between the timestamp of the response and the
request.
We performed three baseline measurements and fourteen trials. Each baseline and trial is
repeated twice making the total number of tests twenty-eight. Table 5.1 summarizes each
trial that was performed.
Our results suggest that using the deltas in response times from ICMP Echo requests and
List Identity requests may not be meaningful metrics for determining whether fuzzing has
an observable effect on the performance of the SUT. Using the Tukey’s Honest Significant
Difference (HSD) test there is no significant difference in response times when fuzzing
compared to when sending non-malformed traffic. Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 illustrates
Tukey HSD graphs for the fuzzing metric with the EtherNet/IP Register Session and CIP
NOP commands, respectively. In this example, we see that all populations appear to
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Table 5.1. Table of ICS Fuzzing Trials
Trial Name Layer Field Fuzzed
enip-register-session-baseline EtherNet/IP NA
enip-register-session-fuzz-protocol-version EtherNet/IP Protocol Version
enip-register-session-fuzz-option-flag EtherNet/IP Options Flags




cip-nop-fuzz-class-instance CIP Class, Instance
pccc-exec-baseline PCCC NA
pccc-exec-fuzz-byte PCCC Byte Size
pccc-exec-fuzz-file-no PCCC File Number
pccc-exec-fuzz-file-type PCCC File Type
pccc-exec-fuzz-element PCCC Element Number
pccc-exec-fuzz-all PCCC File Number, File Type, Element Number
overlap, therefore the null hypothesis (that the samples represent the same distribution, i.e.,
the latencies were unaffected) cannot be rejected.
On the other hand, with Tukey’s HSD test for the fuzzing metric with the Execute PCCC
Service command, we observed some sensitivity in the metric. Figure 5.7 is a Tukey
HSD graph of the fuzzing the metric for tests run on the Execute PCCC Service. The
graph suggests the performance may be a good metric for analysis, however the results are
inconsistent. For example, when comparing pccc-exec-fuzz-file-no-1 and pccc-exec-fuzz-
file-no-2 we expected that the mean latencies would overlap based on tests performed on
EtherNet/IP Register Session and CIP NOP test cases, but instead we observe a statistical
difference between these populations. We observe similar anomalous results when com-
paring pccc-exec-fuzz-byte-1 with pccc-exec-fuzz-byte-2. (See Appendix B for a more
detailed discussion of our analysis using Tukey HSD.)
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Figure 5.7. Tukey HSD on Fuzz Tests of Execute PCCC Service
This graph is a Tukey HSD comparison between the fuzz tests on the Execute
PCCC Service
Figure 5.8. Tukey HSD of Fuzz Tests on EtherNet/IP Register Session
This graph is a Tukey HSD comparison between the fuzz tests on the EtherNet/IP
Register Session.
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Figure 5.9. Tukey HSD Fuzz Tests on CIP NOP
This graph is a Tukey HSD comparison between the fuzz tests on the CIP NOP.
5.3.1 Denial of Service Fault
When fuzzing the Execute PCCC Service, a DoS service fault was triggered. This result
is not represented in the deltas discussed previously; we identified the type of packet that
caused the fault and bypassed it to produce the the results in Figure 5.7. By sending a
specially crafted Execute PCCC Service packet to the SUT a Major Error (0x8) is triggered
and the device becomes unresponsive. To clear the fault the device to continue operations,
the device must be power-cycled and re-set using the RSLogix Clear Major Fault utility.
Figure 5.10 is the hex output of the Status File during the Faulted state. A report on the
DoS fault is available in Appendix A.
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Figure 5.10. MicroLogix 1100 Status File
This figure is the hex output of the MicroLogix 1100 Status File during the Faulted
state.
It appears that this is a previously unreported DoS vulnerability caused by accessing certain
Data Files with an invalid File Type. According to the MicroLogix 1100 reference manual,
data files store status and data information associated with instructions used in ladder
subroutines [37, p. 40–41]. CVE-2012-4690 describes of a DoS fault caused when a
malformed CIP packet is written to the Status file [38]. It is not clear if these two faults are
related as our fault does not involve any write requests. Allen Bradley has issued firmware
releases for the MicroLogix 1100 to mitigate this vulnerability. We currently use Firmware
Revision Number (FRN) 14 and, according to the release notes for this version, the anomaly
identified in CVE-2012-4690 was corrected in FRN 13: “Status file bits [...] were write
able through communication messages which allowed the possibility to force the controller
to go into fault. The solution included in this firmware revision allows users to CLEAR
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these bits [...] but does NOT allow them to SET using Communication Messages” [39, p.




The diversity and complexity of embedded control systems on Navy afloat and ashore
platformsmake it difficult to protect them. The use of industrial components that implement
proprietary protocols further exacerbates the problem. This chapter presents a summary of
the results and findings of our attempt to address this impediment, and provides suggestions
for follow-on work.
6.1 Summary
Prior to development, we investigated the strengths and weaknesses of two known fuzzing
approaches: mutation-based and generation-based. We found that mutation-based fuzzing
requires less up-front research to understand the specifications of the SUT and more test-
ing effort to obtain sufficient code coverage. Generation-based testing, on the other hand,
requires detailed understanding of the SUT to construct grammar-based test specifications.
Furthermore, we surveyed existing fuzzing frameworks and fuzzers to determine the avail-
ability of EtherNet/IP fuzzers. We found two custom Scapy-based fuzzers for other common
industrial protocols, i.e., Modbus and Profinet, but to the best of our understanding, there
is no open-source fuzzer supporting EtherNet/IP or CIP.
We developed a Scapy-based fuzzer and a packet dissector library that could handle Eth-
erNet/IP packets with encapsulated CIP and PCCC messages. We validated our dissector
with a packet capture corpus that included EtherNet/IP traffic generated by two different
AB/RA platforms, i.e., MicroLogix 1100 and ControlLogix 5570. We used a MicroLogix
1100 as the SUT for our fuzzer.
While stress testing the MicroLogix 1100’s handling of PCCC messages, we discovered a
potential flaw in its implementation of the Execute PCCC Service request. We searched the
ICS-CERT vulnerability database and did not find any vulnerability report describing the
observed deficiency. Proper input validation should resolve this vulnerability. Our ability
to cause a DoS fault by sending a single, specially-crafted PCCC Execute Service packet
suggests that there could be other exploitable vulnerabilities in the MicroLogix’s EtherNet/
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IP software.
Another contribution is the use of network response times as a metric for fault detection.
Tukey HSD tests performed suggests there is no significant difference between the response
times captured during normal activity and the response times captured during fuzz testing.
6.2 Future Work
As an extension to this work, the EtherNet/IP support library can be expanded so that it
is fully compliant with the specification [33] [8]. Better handling of propiertary protocols
such as PCCC should also be added [36]– currently, these protocols are not supported
by Wireshark’s dissectors, and thus must be validated through alternative means, such as
manual inspection of traffic.
A custom utility that can calculate latency deltas in request and response in finer granularity
may help improve the remote performancemonitoring capability. Presently, deltas in request
and response are calculated using timestamps observed in Wireshark dumps. For better
precision, we may consider building our own utilities to calculate latencies in response.
We intend to use ENIP Fuzz to test other EtherNet/IP devices. It is possible that other
PCCC implementations are vulnerable to the same Execute Service fault we discovered.
Additionally, investigating the TCP and IP layers of the network stack may also expose
vulnerabilities relating to the assumptions made by the EtherNet/IP implementations about
the underlying TCP/IP mechanisms.
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APPENDIX A:
AB/RA MicroLogix 1100 DoS Vulnerability
We are reporting an exploitable read operation vulnerability for the Allen Bradley Rockwell
Automation MicroLogix Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) implementation of the
Execute PCCC service request. By sending a single, specially-crafted PCCC Execute
Service packet an attacker will cause the device to fault. We tested this on the Allen Bradley
MicroLogix 1100 Programmable Logic Controller, 1763-L16BWA Series B, FRN 14.
A.1 Exploit Proof-of-Concept
To exploit the vulnerability, the attacker sends a single Execute PCCC Service - Protected
Typed Logical Read with Three Address Fields packet with a File Number of 0x2 to 0x8 and
File Type 0x48 or 0x47. Any combination of File Number 0x2 to 0x8 and File Type 0x48
or 0x47 will trigger a Major Error (0x8). Figures A.1 and A.2 illustrate example packets
that will cause the fault.
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Figure A.1. An Example DoS Packet
An Example DoS Packet, highlighting fields encapsulated at the PCCC layer.
32
Figure A.2. Packet Structure of an Example DoS Packet
This figure illustrates the packet structure of an Example DoS Packet, highlighting
fields encapsulated at the PCCC layer.
In addition, to reproduce the fault, it appears that the attacker must establish a session
with the target with an EtherNet/IP Register Session Request and then create a connection
instance with a Connection Manager Forward Open Request. Figure A.3 is a screenshot
of a Wireshark capture detailing the order that packets are sent. Figure A.4 demonstrates
that the DoS packet does not have to immediately follow the Connection Manager Forward
Open Request to cause the fault.
Figure A.3. Wireshark Capture of the Packet Flow of the DoS Fault
A screenshot of a Wireshark capture of an example packet flow that will cause the
DoS Fault.
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Figure A.4. Wireshark Capture of a Second Example Packet Flow of the
DoS Fault
A screenshot of a Wireshark capture demonstrating a second example packet flow
that will cause the DoS Fault.
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APPENDIX B:
Tukey’s HSD Test Data
In Section 5.3 we discuss using Tukey’s Honest Significant Difference test to perform
simultaneous comparison tests on three metrics: the deltas between ICMP Echo requests
from Ping, List Identity requests from RSLinx, and the response from the service request
being fuzzed. Our results from those tests suggests there is no significant difference
response time when fuzzing compared to when sending non-malformed traffic. However
we did observe some sensitivity with Tukey’s HSD test for the fuzzing metric with the
Execute PCCC Service. The following sections will go into more detail on our use of
Tukey’s HSD.
B.1 Tukey’s HSD Means Comparison
Tukey’s HSD performs simultaneous comparison of independent means. Figures B.1 and
B.2 are charts comparing all pairs of tests for the fuzzingmetricwith theEtherNet/IPRegister
Session and CIP NOP, respectively. In this example, we see that, with the exception of the
three tests, the null hypothesis (that the samples represent the same distribution, i.e., the
latencies were unaffected) for the fuzzing metric with the EtherNet/IP Register Session and
CIP NOP cannot be rejected.
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Figure B.1. Tukey’s HSD Multiple Comparison of Means for EtherNet/IP
Register Session
This chart compares latency means for the fuzzing metric with the EtherNet/IP
Register Session.
Figure B.2. Tukey’s HSD Multiple Comparison of Means for CIP NOP
This chart compares latency means for the fuzzing metric with the CIP NOP.
On the other hand, Figure B.3 illustrates the sensitivity in the fuzzing metric for tests run
on the Execute PCCC Service. Based on the inconsistency in which we reject the null
hypothesis, this chart suggests that there is a statistical difference when comparing sample
populations.
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Figure B.3. Tukey’s HSD Multiple Comparison of Means for Execute PCCC
Service
This chart compares latency means for the fuzzing metric with the Execute PCCC
Service.
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